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Mayotte: Mayotte: French Border Construction between Europe and Africa

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Mayotte: French Border Construction between Europe and Africa

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Notes

table of contents
  1. Book Cover
  2. Title Page
  3. Editorial
  4. Mayotte: French Border Construction between Europe and Africa

Mayotte: French Border Construction between Europe and Africa

Rike Stotten

1. Introduction

1This article traces the path of colonization to decolonization up until its current status as a French Overseas Department of the Indian Ocean island of Mayotte. Whereas the other three islands of the Comoros archipelago aimed for sovereignty, there was and still is not much appetite for independence on Mayotte (Baldacchino u. Hepburn 2012). This study is drawing on a broad literature research and observation on site. Scientific literature as well as grey literature from digital available sources and from Les Archives départementales de Mayotte (Archive of the Department of Mayotte) and local media have been consulted during several stays in the Mayotte. Thereby, also the participant observation (see Hay 2010) was realised for a total duration of eight months between 2014-2016. Contact to the local population was gained through daily hitch-hiking – which is a common form of movement as there is nearly no public transport.

2As a result, this article seeks to highlight challenges coming along for the island and its population by staying French. Therewith also questions of national identity and borders as a social construct are discussed. As the geopolitical situation of Mayotte is a unique case, it cannot simply be compared to other small islands, like Vanuatu, La Réunion or French Polynesia (Dumont 2005), as there are not many archipelagos divided between nations (Baldacchino 2013). Now that the departmentalization of Mayotte is fulfilled, it is appropriate to reflect this process and investigate its consequences.

2. Mayotte: Today and its past

3Today, Mayotte is a holistic part of the French Republic. Its official language is French and the island’s currency is the Euro. Further, its population participates in French elections and take benefits of the French social security system (Mathieu 2015). With more than 8,000 km South of Paris, it is located in the northern Mozambique Channel in the Indian Ocean. It consists of two nearby inhabited islands of 376 km2. The smaller one, Petit Terre, nearly 11 km2, was once the administrative capital for the Comoros archipelago. However, today’s capital Mamoudzou is located on Grand Terre, where the huge majority of the population is living. The population of approximately 256,500 inhabitants includes more than 40% foreigners, around half of them illegal and therefore undocumented, from neighbouring Comoros (INSEE Mayotte 2017). Mayotte is a predominantly Islamic department (97% of the population) and more than 70% of the children between 3-10 years visit a Koran school. However, there is also a small Christian population living on the island, made up principally of mainland French and foreign residents (Lewis 2011). Although French is the official language, the main language spoken in Mayotte is Shimaoré (Shikomoro, around 70%), a Bantu dialect from East Africa. After that, nearly 25% of the population, mainly towards the southern areas of the main island, also speaks Kibushy, a dialect of Malagasy (Austronesian language) (Blanchy 2002; Gueunier u. Said 2001; Blanchy-Daurel 1990). French is still poorly spoken by the majority of the Mahorais population (Sueur et al. 2012; Mathieu 2015) and though there is evidence of progress being made, in reality it is still very far from being the mother tongue (Du Payrat 2012; INSEE Mayotte 2012).

4The islands economy is far from self-sufficient and depends heavily on French state financial assistance, mainly delivered via social benefits and subsidies. The official unemployment rate is around 37% and is even higher amongst the young population. The GDP per capita, €5,550 in 2005, had increased to €7,900 by 2011. Still, it remains much lower than that of mainland France or even La Réunion, as another Overseas Department in the Indian Ocean. The increase in GDP is also due to the increased number of civil servants on the island – both local Mahorais and mainland French – which more than doubled from 3,300 in 2005 to 7,000 in 2011(INSEE Mayotte 2014b). It is evident that the public sector influences the local economy to a significant extent (Mathieu 2015).

2.1 French Colonization

5Basically, three ethnic groups represent the early settlers of the Comoros archipelago until the 15th century: the Arabs, the Africans and the Malayo-Indonesians. This area has since been a crossroad of cultures. Shortly after the Portuguese stopped fleetingly on Grande Comore in the 16th century, Mayotte became an independent sultanate. The following century Mayotte suffered from lootings and robberies from the other Comoros Islands themselves and also from Madagascar (Sellier et al. 2008; Lechamand 1994).

6Inter-island migration due to the spatial proximity and shared kindship among the four islands resulted in common socio-cultural characteristics (Baker 2009). However, each of the island is marked by a distinctive political history (Blanchy 2002). The Malagasy sultan of Mayotte, Andriantssouli, reigned in Mayotte from 1828. Expelled from Madagascar, threatened by the other Comoros Islands – especially the nearest one Anjouan – he saw his own position jeopardized. Thus, he sold the island to France, to be protected against the surrounding threats and in return for a pension as well as education for two of his sons on Réunion Island. Additionally, France accepted to respect the inviolability of native lands and the practices of Islam on the island (Aldrich and Connell 2006). Mayotte was therefore not occupied by the French, “mais a répondu à une demande de protection” (it just responded to a request of protection) (Caminade 2010: 51). However, it was not exactly an act of altruism: the geographic position of Mayotte on the African continent in the northern Mozambique Channel, was becoming increasingly important, due to its strategical location. Nevertheless, the request made to France for protection was a successful one as the rate of robberies was greatly reduced. Decades later the other three islands Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli became French, too (Caminade 2010; Du Payrat 2012).

7Combined into one entity, the four islands of the Comoros archipelago were transformed into a province of the French colony of Madagascar, which marked the disempowerment of the sultans by the French sovereign. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, in 1947, the four Comoros Islands became a Territoire d’outre-mer (Overseas Territory) (Hassan 2009). Under French sovereignty, the capital was located at Dzaoudzi on Petite Terre, which gave Mayotte a strong political and economic position among the Comoros Islands. However in 1958, it was decided by the local authorities to transfer the capital to Moroni on Grande Comore, the largest of the four main islands of the Comoros (Mathieu 2015; Aldrich and Connell 1992).

8This transfer, realised in a long period until 1966, led Mayotte to lose not just its political importance but also economic stability, due to the numbers of civil servants who were transferred to the new capital, along with their precious salaries. This process provoked violent demonstrations against Comorians but also against the Minister of Overseas France. However, Mayotte lost its privileged position within the archipelago (Mathieu 2015; Aldrich and Connell 2006). Already by that time, while the islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli were working towards independence from France, the Mouvement Populaire Mahorais (political party in Mayotte) was instead focussing in the other direction, that of departmentalization (Blanchy 2002).

2.2 Political separatism of the Comoros Islands in the 1970s

9The overall process of decolonization started just after the Second World War, when the former colonies Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane and La Réunion became French Overseas Departments in 1946. Otherwise, France and its African territories moved towards separation (Aldrich 2010). Rather late, the Archipelago of the Comoros Islands was put on the list for the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the United Nations the 25th of August 1972. Shortly afterwards France officially declared the possibility of granting the Comoros Islands independence within a timeframe of five years depending on a positive vote by its population (Hassan 2009).

10Mayotte voted in the referendum of independence on the 22nd of December 1974 to stay French, whereas the other three islands, Anjouan, Mohéli and Grande Comore, expressed with more than 99% their will to become independent. Therefore, on 6th July 1975, the president Ahmed Abdallah declared, without waiting for a decision from France, the independent State of Comoros (as it was the official name by then; today it is Union of the Comoros). Importantly, he also claimed jurisdiction of Mayotte, despite the vote there against independence (Hassan 2009). Therefore, in theory, the Comorian state consists of all four main islands of the Comoros archipelago.

11To take a closer look at the reasons why the Mahorais decided to remain French, there is evidence that to be French was seen as to be free, as the slogan “nous voulons rester français pour être libre“ (we want to remain French to be free) was often visible during several demonstrations. However, the vote was not necessarily a sign of Mayotte’s support for France but rather a reflection of opposition to her three sister islands (Mathieu 2015). Annexation by the other islands of the Comoros archipelago would have been “as a disastrous colonial occupation worse than the protective, wealthy French administration.“ (Muller 2013, 186). Even earlier though, the Mahorais had already expressed in several demonstrations their desire to stay French and not to gain independence with the other islands. Several unclear explanations were expressed, such as the fact that Mayotte is French since 1841, longer than other departments such as Savoie in the Rhône-Alpes region of the mainland, as well as the fact that the island became affiliated to Paris long before Grande Comore. Further on, the transfer of the capital from Dzaoudzi to Moroni heavily influenced the separatist sentiments among the Mahorais: “The origin of the separatism is largely linked to the transfer of the capital” (Caminade 2010, 52, own translation).

12A second vote on all four islands was foreseen five years later in case of disunity among them (Torre 2008), but the provisional status of Mayotte continued until the second referendum just on one of them on 8th January 1976. Again, the Mahorais voted with 99.42% in favour to be completely integrated into the French system and espoused the values of liberté, egalité, fraternité. Despite a United Nations (UN) resolution from the 6th February 1976 recognizing Mayotte as Comorian, thus declaring the Mahorian referendum result void, France used – as the only member – its veto power. As a result the French annexing of Mayotte remains illegal in international law, due to the principle of uti possidetis (latin for ‘as you possess by law') that requires respecting colonial borders as a guide in the creation of independent states (Caminade 2010; Du Payrat 2012). This is based on a 1960s UN resolution on the guarantee of territorial integrity after decolonization, in theory to avoid civil or border wars. The UN continued to press its case for decolonization, they considered the voting result of the archipelago as one – but Mayotte resisted (Baker 2009). Other institutions, such as the Arab League, the African Union and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, also proclaimed the illegality of French Mayotte as it should have been decolonized with its sister islands. Even European countries, such as the Scandinavian States, criticised the French way of decolonization in the Comoros archipelago (Du Payrat 2012). Even today, the claim to Mayotte by the Union of the Comoros remains on the UN General Assembly’s agenda (United Nations; Donaldson 2014).

13Overall, “independence [of the Comoros Islands] itself was chaotically acquired" (Walker 2007, 596). Since, the Union of the Comoros struggle to attain political and economic viability. Reasons for that are not just related to governance, but also on a structural level. Several successful or attempted coups contributed to this fact. Interestingly, four coups have been organised by the French mercenary Bob Denard (Baker 2009). Tensions escalated in 1997, when the island of Anjouan declared its independence with the aim to be reintegrated into the French system, which was immediately followed by Mohéli. However, France declined this request, whereupon Mohéli turned back to the Union, but Anjouan kept striving towards its reintegration. All in all, the separation of the islands in the Comoros archipelago enhanced tensions among them.

2.3 Departmentalization of Mayotte

14Mayotte stayed French, though its temporary statuses changed several times: from CTOM (collectivité territoirale d’outre-mer) it changed to DTOM (collectivité départementale d’outre-mer) in 2001 and into a COM (collectivité d’outre-mer) in 2003 as a step forwards the departmentalization later on. The clear reasons why Mayotte finally became a French Overseas Department are vague (Caminade 2010; Mathieu 2015). Nevertheless, during the presidential election campaign Nicolas Sarkozy announced in May 2008 a status referendum about the transformation of Mayotte into a department. Not surprisingly, on 29th March 2009 Mayotte’s population voted with a huge majority (95%) for the departmentalization of their island (Torre 2008; Şen 2015). For the local population the benefits of wealth with the achievement of social and economic aids are quite clear. However, to access child and unemployment benefits as well as pension rights means to adapt the traditional (African-Muslim) lifestyle to the French system. In other words, it is a 'de-Comorianization' of Mayotte. So, the legal and social framework was adapted: customary and Islamic law were abolished, which implies for example the abolition of polygamy, Islamic marriages, customary rules of inheritance and also the imposition of family names (Walker 2007; Blanchy and Moatty 2012).

15For France (and the EU) there are economic and geostrategic reasons on the forehand to make Mayotte Island a department and therefore part of the European Union: the fishing rights in the ‘exclusive economic zone’ (any waters within 200 miles around the coast; France possesses the second-largest one just behind the USA) (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2012), predicted oil deposits close to Madagascar (Benito 2012; Aldrich u. Connell 2006), as well as a military base in the Indian Ocean where still important petrol shipping routes are located (Du Payrat 2012). Nevertheless, the most important reason for France “might be presidential vanity and global ambitions, in particular the revived determination to rehabilitate the overseas” (Muller 2013, 198). Therefore, the maintenance of a modern day ‘mini-empire’ with its Overseas Departments and Territories, like French Polynesia or New Caledonia, dotted around the globe, represents for France the ‘Republic’s dancing girls’ (as President Giscard d’Estaing marked them) – exotic to have and expensive to keep (Aldrich 2010; Baldacchino and Hepburn 2012).

16Since the 31st of March 2011 Mayotte has officially been the 101st French department – even if the mainland French population did not have a say. While the European Union does not actively take part in the sovereignty debate (Muller 2013), as a consequence of the departmentalization, Mayotte entered the European Union on the 1st January 2014. It is classified as an Outermost Region, in common with other French Overseas Departments, as well as the Canary Islands of Spain. Therefore EU law is applied on the island (with some exceptions due to its remote geographical position) (Centavi 2014). With its new status, the island can benefit from several European development programs1 as it is less developed compared to other regions on the EU ‘mainland’. Nevertheless, within its region, Mayotte is much wealthier than the surrounding countries are and therewith the socio-political shift from an ancient colony into a department is remarkable in the islands countryside. Development becomes for example visible by new infrastructures, such as roads and public buildings, but also the establishment of westernized super market chains (Mathieu 2015).

17By definition, decolonization means the process in which a former colony becomes politically independent. Therefore the question arose whether Mayotte ever has been decolonized, as they only achieved independence from their sister islands by a democratic vote (Muller 2013). However, decolonization does not just include the change of the legal status, but also a broad historical process and a cultural transformation (Kalter and Rempe 2011). By contrast, departmentalization is an integration of a former colony formally completely into a European political, economic, social and cultural system. Therefore, France’s claim to Mayotte is perceived as a deepening of colonization (Aldrich and Connell 2006).

3. The construction of borders

18Borders are a marker of differences. Although the concept of borders was once seen as rigid, it is nowadays discussed in a constructivist perspective, as a socially constructed phenomenon (Sendhardt 2013; Laine 2016). A newly constructed border is accepted if the corresponding narration makes sense to its local residents. To influence also identity, the narrations related to the border needs to be constantly communicated: the space behind the border starts to make a distinction if the belonging stories tell that (Eder 2007). Borders are therefore “the object of a permanent process of telling and retelling stories from which identities sometimes emerge. Therefore, borders are as variable as the stories with which they are constructed.” (Eder 2006, 266). Thus, borders do not only rely on political institutions, but on shared stories about boundaries and its negotiation, which makes a border to an objective reality (Berger et al. Plessner 2016). The socially constructed narratives influence the socially performed border in everyday life even more (Eder 2006). Hence borders manifest themselves and are deepened in social practice as well as economic, cultural, administrative and political activities and discourses (Paasi 1999), so importance is not just given to the border itself, but also to the question how it is socially performed, as an interaction between people and structural factors. Therefore also the process of bordering, as a strategic action to differentiate movements of people in space, goes beyond the geographical demarcation line (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; Brunet-Jailly 2013). Borders are further lines to make the distinction between “us” and “other”, to contribute to a collective identity within the borders (Newman u. Paasi 1998) and to strengthen the separating narrative (Eder 2006); in other words, to “to make a difference in space among the movements of people” (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002, 126).

4. Being French: Challenges Coming along

19With the acquisition of the status as a Department, social tensions on Mayotte exacerbated on several levels, which will be illuminated below.

4.1 Demographic growth

20Since the 1960s Mayotte has had a strong population increase, from approximately 23,000 inhabitants in 1958 to more than 250,000 today due to a variety of factors (INSEE Mayotte 2012; INSEE Mayotte 2017). Firstly, the demographic transition is not yet complete; life expectancy is increasing while infant mortality is decreasing, as is common in EU states, yet at the same time the birth rate remains high (4 children per women in 2015, which is the highest birth rate among all French departments; including Overseas Departments). Further on, a difference can be pointed out for the fertility rate among women: for French (Mahorais) women it is 3.4 whereas it is 6.4 for women born in the Union of the Comoros. Secondly, immigration has also had a massive impact on the population growth – estimations suggest that the percentage of foreigners on Mayotte (both legal and illegal) – is around 40% (Mathieu 2015; INSEE Mayotte 2017).

21To take a closer look at the demographic pattern, the age pyramid shows a solid base as more than half of the population is less than 20 years old. A bend shapes the pyramid for the age range 20-30, as those younger Mahorais (not Comorians) with qualifications leave the island for further education, mainly to France (INSEE Mayotte 2014a). As those Mahorais often stay there eventually, Mayotte suffers from a brain drain too (Mathieu 2015). Contrary, even if Comorians (legal or illegal) are eligible to enter the French education system, they cannot leave Mayotte without a special visa, which basically confines them on the island.

4.2 Migratory pull factors

22Even if the phenomenon of island migration is neither unique nor new (Bernadie-Tahir u. Schmoll 2014) the changed political status of Mayotte symbolizes an important migratory pull factor: “The geopolitical situation is the motor behind migration” (Dumont 2005, 522). The Union of the Comoros is ranked 160 (out of 188, 2016) countries in the UN Human Development Index (United Nations 2017) and since independence, the situation is getting worse (Donaldson 2014). From Anjouan, the closest island to Mayotte, sometimes even visible at just over 60 km away, immigration from Comoros, East and Central Africa is on the rise (Caminade 2010; Muller 2013). Up into the 1990´s Comorian citizens were allowed to move freely between the islands. However, since the government of Edouard Balladur implemented on 1st January 1995 new visa regulation for inter-island circulation, known as the ‘Visa Balladur’, illegal immigration rose heavily. The main drivers behind this immigration are not only an economic motivation, but also family reasons, future prospects for children, healthcare, education and the political insecurity of the Union of Comoros (Münger 2011; Baillot et al. 2012; Mathieu 2015).

23Anjouanese traffickers smuggle migrants on small boats, known as kwassakwassa (small motorised fishing boats designed for up to 8 persons), overloaded with upwards of 30 to 40 people during night-time crossings to the small uninhabited island of M’zamboro of the North-West coast of Grande Terre. In Mayotte, around 20,000 deportations are conducted each year (22,677 in 2016; La Cimade 2017); among them a significant number of children and youth. Nevertheless, it is part of a circular movement, as the deported will quickly find their way back to the island. The transit in the small boats is dangerous, especially as most of the passengers are unable to swim. Illegal migration is by definition difficult to estimate, but somewhere in the region of 7,000 – 12,000 are assumed to have died attempting the crossing since the new visa regulations came into force in 1995 (Sueur et al. 2012). Therefore the passage between Anjouan and Mayotte is known not only as the largest maritime cemetery, but also the mur de Berlin aquatique due to its similarity with the wall that marked not just the former physical border between in East and West Berlin, but also an artificial line separating German families (Münger 2011).

24The social discourse about immigration, especially from Anjouan is seen negatively (Blanchy 2002; Mathieu 2015). In everyday life illegal immigration and the resulting clandestine population are very present. For example, immigrants waiting in front of the hospital in Mamoudzou for medical services2 or to give birth, as entering into the social health insurance system is reserved only for French and foreigner with official documents (Baillot et al. 2012; Etienne 2011). This also creates discontent among the Mahorais, because this ‘leaves them waiting’ for their own medical treatment and are dispossessed of their own medical structure. Furthermore, the education system is heavily overcrowded and several infrastructures, like class rooms, sport areas, canteens are missing (INSEE Mayotte 2017). This fact increases instances of racism among pupils, which also leads to security issues in and around school structures (Mathieu 2015). On the other hand, if born on Mayotte, children are eligible for French citizenship if they have proof of being there for five years, which can be done with a regular school attendance. In addition, immigrants are very present on the black labour market too (Torre 2008; Loyens 2015a). Often they work for subsistence wages or less for the Mahorais or Wazungu (European, White; sg. mzungu) (Mathieu 2015).

4.3 Population Density

25The demographic pressure causes a rapidly increasing population density (570 hab./km²) on what is a very limited habitable land area, with the highest densities recorded in the municipalities of Mamoudzou and Sada as well as most of Petite Terre (INSEE Mayotte 2012). On top of that, slums in the hilly terrain of the settlements and especially in Mamoudzou are rising, which causes problems for the infrastructure and social security within those areas. Moreover with the increased habitation from an environmental perspective, the hills are vulnerable to soil erosion, especially during the rainy season during austral summer (Loyens 2015b).

4.4 Social tensions

26Further, racism is also fed by the demographic composition on Mayotte. Not just that the historical route – politically created by the French – has constructed a border between the islands and has as a result made a distinction between Mahorais and Comorians, it has also caused discrimination for Comorians as foreigner on Mayotte (Etienne 2011). Moreover, population density and limited resources fuels tensions. Racist ideas affects mainly Comorians (due to their large number), but also other immigrants from East and Central Africa as well as Madagascar (Mathieu 2015). This is for example expressed through activities such as chasing away the Anjouanais population by wanton destruction of their dwellings, mostly the slums (Lutte Ouvriere 2003). The introduction of the housing tax in 2016 resulted in an outbreak of social tensions. For many years, several Mahorais allowed Comorian relatives to settle on their property. Since it became a financial issue, they were not accepted anymore by their property owners and been dislodged by local communities in several villages. Transitionally, those dislodged Comorians have been placed at a central place in the capital, waiting to find a new home or to be expelled afterwads (own observation, see also Brocheton 2016). Additionally, resentment against the wazungu, the white population, exists, as they often display an unaffordable lifestyle due to bonuses on their salaries as well as the persisting representation of colonial domination (Fdesouche and Zebulon 2012; Etienne 2011).

27The need for improved education infrastructure is exponentially increasing: whereas in 19843 just four pupils graduated high school, there were more than 3,600 high school pupils registered to graduate in 20174 (Vice-Rectorat Mayotte 2017). Even though the budget for public education is rising, the number of children and adolescents in education is growing much faster than the current system can handle, one result being a lack of teaching staff and infrastructure. However, many pupils leave school each year without achieving any school-leaving qualification (INSEE Mayotte 2014a). The local labour market can ‘just’ substitute less than 1,000 of them. This huge lack of opportunities for a young, less qualified workforce creates frustration (Sueur et al. 2012; Mathieu 2015).

28Estimations suggest that there are between 3,000 and 6,000 orphans living on Mayotte. As children cannot be deported without any legal representatives, they are often left behind to guarantee them education and access to the health system. But there are no structures like orphanages on the island and other families often do not take care of them, so that as a result they have to look after themselves (Torre 2008).

29In daily life crime is a big issue for the population and is on the rise: in 2008 more than 800 robberies were registered by the gendarmerie – not including those not reported as well as those attempted but which did not succeed (Torre 2008; linternaute 2015). Most of all, robberies are causing security issues: not just burglaries into private houses, but also into private as well as public enterprises. Pickpocketing is an issue in and around Mamoudzou. Besides, a growing number of gangs of youth – confronted with a lack of prospects – are endangering the security on the island (Torre 2008). With the rising presence of crime, insecurity on the islands has increased and it has become normal for the population to live life behind grids. Enhanced security measures - from simple grids on windows to guard dogs to digital security alert systems further separate and segregate local society into rich and poor.

4.5 Economy

30Once Mayotte was known for its Ylang-Ylang production, a blossom used in the fragrance industry, but as the workforce on the island is more expensive than other rival producers, the production collapsed. The semi-arid climate on Mayotte is making the island unfavourable for most forms of temporary economic development (Aldrich and Connell 2006). Today, more than half of the islands GDP is generated in the public sector. In addition, its balance of trade is dramatically negative: exports cover not even 2% of imported goods (Torre 2008; Mathieu 2015). The island is therefore heavily dependent on imported goods just to function. Coming originally from subsistence farming, the official activity rate today is low (41 % of the population aged 15-64), whereas subsistence farming became less important. Traditional consumer behaviour has also changed; imported goods are becoming more and more popular, but do not reflect in any way sustainable development (Du Payrat 2012; Mathieu 2015). French retail chains around Mamoudzou and Petite Terre are fairly overpriced, but their mere existence implants the dream of equating consuming with being more French.

31Tourism is developing poorly in Mayotte (Du Payrat 2012). Even if official structures are created, their efforts show few returns. Further, the tourism infrastructure as well as services cannot provide westernized standards – but ask for westernized prices. Therefore, visitors consists mainly of Mahorais origins or family and friends of mainland French living on the island. Thus, the ‘real’ demand remains a niche for divers (INSEE Mayotte 2017).

5. Mayotte - a French construction

32To be protected from its sister islands and with the political rapprochement to the French mainland, Mayotte was forced more than 150 years ago to deny its own culture, a challenge that is still faced today. Whereas religion had and still has a crucial role on Mayotte Island, the French Republic is secular. A marriage according to Islamic law in front of a qadi is nowadays a private religious act; solely an administrative wedding officially counts (Blanchy and Moatty 2012). Public education in Mayotte is the same as in any other French department. Teaching subjects are related to mainland France such as the Second World War, rather than their own local history, which would contribute to their own local identity formation. In addition, the French language is supposed to be the mother tongue and so it is taught. Therefore, the French context is rarely or not at all adapted to local issues. However, the official setting coming along with departmentalization is changing much quicker than identity is – or even can as it tends to resist change (Du Payrat 2012). Nevertheless, the two spoken languages, Shimaoré and Kibushy are more and more mixed with French – creolized – and risk disappearing (Muller 2013).

33Identity formation is the ability of someone to unfold his respectively her psychological competences in relation about his or her place within a society. This process is not just related to the present, but also to individual possible futures (Côté and Levine 2015). Thus, the question of identity arose to determine one’s place in relation to other people, but more importantly in relation to the society. On Mayotte, the identity among the Mahorais was for a long time distinguished by belonging to a village, living by subsistence farming and being Muslim. French colonial and assimilationist policies marked and are still influencing identity formation in Mayotte (Lambeck 1990; Nevin 2009; Blanchy-Daurel 1990). The Wazoungu not only brought the French system, but also a westernized lifestyle of a service society. As agriculture was not a symbol of modernity, agricultural work was devalued. The choice to be French changed the cultural order on the island to a significant extent, as for example the position of the qadi, the Muslim judge, who had an important role within the Mahorais culture until departmentalization. Since, he has lost his traditional function (see Blanchy, 2002).

34Even if the Mahorais population voted to remain French, French identity is imposed in a top-down process; it is literally just slipped over the existing one; e.g. through education or the role of religion. This process is implemented with little attention by Europe and even the French mainland population (Etienne 2011), “France’s game of turning 200,000 Muslim Africans into Franco-European citizens meets little overt resistance, because the greatest importance for the Mahorais is being First, not Third World.” (Muller, 2013, 192). This leads into confusion, as the political system is French nowadays, the history both French and Comorian, the language from Madagascar and East Africa, the culture above all African and Muslim. Even as a French department, France is somehow perceived as an external power and not at all as a set, Mayotte itself is part of (Du Payrat 2012). The political integration of the island is in conflict with its Afro-Islamic customs (Muller 2013), but the Mahorais themselves voted for it. The identity is a mirror of social practice in and social relation to a society - which does not change with migration between the Comoros Islands and Mayotte, neither with a political identity (Côté and Levine 2016; van Houtum u. van Naerssen 2002).

35The politically created border between Mayotte and the Comoros Islands exists since the referendum of independence. Since, the narrative about Mayotte and the Comoros developed into a separating story. Currently, the prevailing negotiation of the border makes a clear distinction between Mahorais respectively French and Comorians. Even if the borderline itself did not change, the introduction of the visa changed the process of bordering as a social act and burdens heavily on the narrative. The Mahorais-Comorian border clearly expresses the “us”, the Mahorais, the French and the “others”, the Comorians. It contributes to make a distinction between rich and poor, between developed and not-developed, advantaged and disadvantaged. The path dependency of the Mahorais-Comorian border is a result of their history – therefore not changeable. The embeddedness by contrast, the actions of politically and socially performing the border, is changeable, therefore adaptable. A turn in the prevailing narrative – the one of separation and racism – could contribute to mitigate social tensions.

6. Conclusion

36The case of Mayotte shows us that borders are social constructions. They are politically implemented by states, in this case France, and then socially constructed by the population, in this case the Mahorais. However, there are two different constructions of borders occurring. The imposed French border accepted by the Mahorais population and the cultural Comorian border, as perceived by the population of the Union of the Comoros. This discrepancy results in an ongoing territorial dispute. Further, the two prevailing narratives on each side – separatism and unification – sharpen the border.

37Additionally, existing pressure on Mayotte presented above contribute to harden the narrative, resulting in unbearable social tensions on the island. The constructed French border “is faced with the reality of having a portion of La Belle France side by side with the impoverished Comorian state, one of the world’s poorest.” (Nevin 2009, 83). However, also on Mayotte Island it is the process of bordering, as explained above, and not the border itself that is ordering the society. This process of bordering changed dramatically with the implementation of the visa requirement, and is sharpened by the departmentalization. Therewith, the narrative behind the border is strengthened and contributes to the social border construction between Mayotte and its sister islands. And finally, the prevailing social construction of the border is performing the distinction among human beings. To conclude, I cite Georg Simmel (2006) who argued that the “border is not a spatial fact with a sociological effect, but a sociological fact that forms spatially” (17; own translation).

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Notes
[1]

16As POSEI (programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity), EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development), EFF (European Fisheries Fund), ESF (European Social Fund) and ERDF (European Regional Development Fund).

[2]

24Until 2005 treatment was free for all non-affiliated residents, primarily Comorians; today patients without documents are asked for 10€ for any treatment (Baillot et al. 2012).

[3]

27The first high school on Mayotte opened in 1980 in Mamoudzou.

[4]

27However, more than 30 % of the pupils leave high school each year without any qualification.

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